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AGENCY AND INSURANCE: SHOULD THE DEFENSE OF
FRAUD BY ITS OWN AGENT BE AVAILABLE TO AN
INSURANCE COMPANY ISSUING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE?
J. DENNIS HYNES*
In April of 1967 Mr. Y, driving at 110 miles per hour on the wrong
side of a highway while completely intoxicated, crashed head-on into a
car proceeding carefully on its side of the road. Two of the four occu-
pants in the other car were killed, and the other two severely injured.
Mr. Y had no significant assets, but was insured up, to $25,000 per acci-
dent. The plaintiffs, in seeking redress for the accident, were informed
by Mr. F's insurance company that it chose not to honor the claim since
it had discovered that Mr. Y and the insurance agent (an independent
broker who wrote policies for several insurance companies) had col-
lusively defrauded the company by falsely stating in the application form
that Mr. Y had had no prior accidents, when both the agent and Mr. Y
knew that the opposite was true.
The above fact situation, taken from an actual case,' poses an in-
teresting problem of agency law as well as of insurance law. Should an
insurance company which underwrites automobile insurance be able to
assert the traditional remedy of annulment of an outstanding policy on
the basis of fraud in the making of the contract ?
At first glance, with some possible reservations in the area of agency
law, the answer would seem obvious. Anyone who is fraudulently in-
duced to enter into a contract should have the right to annul that contract
upon discovering the fraud. This common sense reaction depends in no
little part upon the fact that insurance contracts are consensual arrange-
ments, and anything which destroys a good faith, objectively based con-
sent should also destroy the contract, if the defrauded party so desires.
It is nevertheless true, however, that this position, which is reflected in
the common law today,' must remain viable-or be changed-in the light
of changing social conditions. The major impact of automobile accidents
*J. Dennis Hynes is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Colorado
School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Ronald
B. Porter, third year student at the University of Colorado School of Law.
1. The case, which arose in Colorado, was settled out of court some 10 months
after the accident.
2. A contract made under these circumstances is voidable. See 1 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 6 (1963). See also PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 490
(2d ed. 1957) ; 7 COUcH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 35:109 (2d ed. 1961).
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on today's society,' the ever-increasing interest of the state in the insur-
ance relationship,4 and a gradual shift in the underlying policy of tort law
toward increasing compensation of victims" supply the change in social
conditions. Agency law supplies the vehicle through which the common
law can accomplish a broadening of an insurance company's responsibility
for its agent's acts.
Traditionally, automobile insurance has served the function of en-
abling persons to protect their assets against whatever liabilities may arise
from pursuing an activity admittedly fraught with risk. This meant that
the insurance company only became involved when the insured's assets
were imperiled. It was once true, for example, that an insurance com-
pany could take refuge behind the economic condition of its insured. An
insured had to pay a liability imposed by law against him before his in-
surance company was liable under its policy, which was a contract of in-
demnity against loss rather than a contract of indemnity against liability.'
If the insured became insolvent and was unable to pay a judgment which
had been rendered against him, the company was without obligation to
pay under the policy, with the result that there was "a general practice
among insurance companies to . . . put the assured through bankruptcy,
thereby precluding a recovery on the part of the injured person . . .7
If the insurance relationship is looked upon merely as a two party,
private contractual relationship, this result makes perfect sense. An in-
solvent insured would not need the protection of the policy and the in-
surer was there to protect the assets, up to the limits of the policy, for
3. It has been estimated that the cost of traffic accidents in the United States is
between $8 billion and $12 billion a year. This is roughly the same magnitude as the
entire annual cost of providing the roadways on which the accidents occur. See Vickery,
Automobile Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities, and Insurance: An Ecomonist's
Critique, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 464 (1968).
4. See text accompanying notes 8-12, infra.
5. See Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P. 2d 912 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (negli-
gently inflicted mental distress) ; Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561
(Sup. Ct. 1968) (rejecting classifications for persons entering the land of others);
and Annot. 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967) (describing the expansion of compensation in the
area of products liability).
6. A typical indemnity policy read, in relevant part, as quoted in Patterson v.
Adan, 119 Minn. 308, 309-11, 138 N.W. 281, 282 (1912) :
The company agrees to indemnify the assured: Against loss by reason of the
liability imposed by law upon the assured for damages on account of bodily
injuries, or death accidentally suffered by any person . . . by reason of the
maintenance, or use . . . of the insured's automobile . . . No action shall lie
against the company to recover for any loss or expense under this policy,
unless it shall be brought by the assured for loss or expense actually sustained
and paid in money by him after the trial of the issue.
7. C. GREGORY AND H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTs 555 (1959),
quoting from Roth v. National Auto. Mut. Cas. Co., 202 App. Div. 667, 669, 195 N.Y.
Supp. 865, 867 (1922).
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one who did.
The state at this point demonstrated an interest in the liability in-
surance relationship through legislation generally requiring that, in the
event of bankruptcy or insolvency of an insured, an injured person could
maintain an action against the insurance company under the terms of the
policy for the amount of the judgnient, not exceeding the limits of the
policy.' This type of statute, which forced another function onto liability
insurance, survived a constitutional due process attack, with the United
States Supreme Court making the argument that :'
". ... the business of insurance is of such a peculiar character,
affects so many people and is so intimately connected with the
common good that the State creating insurance corporations
and giving them authority to engage in that business may, with-
out transcending the limits of legislative power, regulate their
affairs so far at least as to prevent them from committing wrongs
or injustice in the exercise of their corporate functions . . .
Having in mind the sense of immunity of the owner protected
by the insurance and the possible danger of a less degree of
care due to the immunity, it would seem to be a reasonable pro-
vision by the State in the interest of the public, whose lives and
limbs are exposed, to require that the owner in the contract
indemnifying him against any recovery from him should stipul-
ate with the insurance company that the indemnity by which he
saves himself should certainly inure to the benefit of the person
who thereafter is injured. Section 109 does not go quite so
far . . ."
Another striking example of the assertion by the public of an interest
in automobile insurance has been the adoption by three states of legisla-
tion requiring that all drivers carry statutorily prescribed minimum
8. See the New York statute providing that, if execution against the insured is
returned unsatisfied because of bankruptcy or insolvency, an action may be maintained
by the injured person against the insurance company for the amount of the judgment
not exceeding the amonunt of the policy, as quoted in Merchants Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins.
Co. v. Smart, 267 U.S. 126, 128 (1925).
9. Id. at 129-30. This position has been belatedly recognized by the insurance
companies themselves, as evidenced by the current version of the National Standard
Policy, which expressly states that bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or of the
insured's estate shall not relieve the company of its obligations under the policy. An
interesting question can be raised as to whether the lawyers for the insurance companies
in the pre-legislation (lays might not have foreseen this type of development and advised
their clients more wisely at a time when the flexibility and creativity of private law
making was available, particularly since two states now have gone so far as to allow
direct actions against insurance companies immediately upon the injured party sus-
taining harm and without the prior satisfaction of any of the conditions in the insurance
policy. 12 CouCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF I[NSURANCE LAW § 45: 821 (2d ed. 1964). For an
illuminating discussion of this aspect of the lawyer's role, see H. HART AND A.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW 263, 287-88 (1958).
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amounts of liability insurance,"0 and the adoption by all the remaining
states of some variant on the financial responsibility laws.'' Further-
more, nearly all of such statutes withdraw the fraud defense, even when
the insured alone has been the cause of the fraud, for persons covered by
the statutory provisions.
1 2
10. R. KEETON AND J. O'CONNELL, BAsIc PROTECTION FOR THE TrAFFIC VICTno,
A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 76 (1965) [hereinafter referred
to as Keeton-O'Connell].
11. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 583 (1964). Prosser indicates
that all states except Alaska have adopted such legislation. It appears, however, that
Alaska has also done so. ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.010 et. seq. (1962). These laws
typically provide that any driver involved in an accident must furnish proof that he is
capable of paying a judgment for that accident up to a specified amount (a liability
insurance policy is of course the easiest form of such proof) or deposit security for such
payment, on penalty of revocation of his license to drive or of the registration of his
automobile. Some jurisdictions draw their statutes more narrowly, with the failure to
satisfy a judgment arising out of an automobile accident constituting the triggering event.
12. All but four of the financial responsibility states expressly provide that
insurance obtained pursuant to the financial responsibility law becomes absolute in
regard to the insurer when loss or damage covered by the polioy occurs. The four
states without such language are: California: CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 1600 et. seq. (West
1960) ; Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. AN N. §§ 14-112 et. seq. (1960) ; Florida: FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 324.011 et seq. (1968) and Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-601 et seq.
(1958). New York has a curious combination of compulsory insurance and financial
responsibility. The New York Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, N.Y. VEH. &
TRAY. LAW § 345(i) (1) provides that a motor vehicle liability policy shall become
absolute whenever loss or damage covered by said policy occurs, but this applies only to
policies issued under that Act (dealing with persons whose licenses have been revoked
or suspended under any of the statutes in the state), and not to the normal compulsorily
issued policy, which is issued under the Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act. See
National Grange Mut. Liab. Co. v. Fino, 212 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1961), which holds to
such effect.
The perceptive reader might ask at this stage whether the above legislation does
not resolve the problem raised by this paper. If the experience of Colorado under its
statute is at all typical, however (and it might understate the nation-wide statistics
somewhat, since the Colorado statute requires a preliminary showing of fault by the
Insurance Commissioner before the statutory provisions become effective), a very small
percentage of drivers on the road are operating under the financial responsibility laws.
It proved impossible to obtain exact information as to the number of persons holding
insurance under the Financial Responsibility Act (called SR-22 policies). However,
Mrs. Rome of the Financial Responsibility section of Driver Improvement, State
Department of Revenue, in a conversation With Mr. Porter on December 10, 1968,
estimated that about fifty per cent of those persons whose licenses are suspended each
year obtain SR-22 policies, which must be held for three years. In 1967 there were
4,773 suspensions. It is roughly estimated, therefore, that at the present time about 6,500
drivers are carrying SR-22 policies. Mr. Covi, Assistant Chief, Drivers' Licensing,
Motor Vehicles Division, State Department of Revenue, in a conversation with Mr.
Porter on December 10, 1968, stated that as of December 31, 1967, there were 1,274,773
licensed drivers in Colorado. This means that approximately one-half of one per cent
of the drivers on the road in Colorado carry insurance under the Financial Respont-
sibility Act.
A further question can be raised as to why this paper does not follow the pattern
of the Financial Responsibility laws and urge abolition of the fraud defense altogether,
rather than merely when the agent participates in the fraud. Such a result indeed would
follow from the premise of this paper, which is that the interests of the public should
be taken into account in this area. But this paper is addressing its position to the courts,
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The increased consciousness of the public nature of automobile in-
surance has not been entirely legislative. Some courts have by common
law eroded the strict effect of some of the contractual defenses and con-
ditions contained in insurance policies. Some jurisdictions require, for
example, that the insurance company demonstrate actual prejudice to its
position arising from the failure of the insured to, fulfill some condition
of the policy before a third party loses his opportunity to collect under the
policy.'" And one state has extended this approach so far as to hold that
the rights of the third party are not overcome even when the insurance
company is actually prejudiced by the failure of the insured to, fulfill a
condition of the policy.
14
When one takes into account the erosion in the traditional function
of automobile liability insurance, the prospect of increasing through the
common law the insurer's responsibility for the acts of its agents loses a
good deal of its radical nature. The law dealing with an insurance com-
pany's responsibilities for its agent's acts has not taken cognizance of the
changing nature of autolnobile liability insurance. It is clear that if an
insurance agent participates in a fraud by the insured on the company, the
company can avoid the policy," with the result that the insured (along
which could adopt the approach set forth in this paper through the traditional doctrine
of respondeat superior. An argument urging overthrow of the defense of fraud altogether
seems more appropriately addressed to the legislature.
13. See 13 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 49:49 (2d ed. 1965)
(generally as to the condition requiring notice) and § 49:127 (as to the condition
requiring notice in automobile liability policies). A different and interesting example of
the judiciary asserting a public interest into the private insurance contract is that of
L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968), where the court
denied the defendant insurance company its contractual power of cancellation (which
was exercised when Dr. L'Orange testified against another doctor who also was
insured by the company) on the ground that the company's exercise of such power
contravened public policy since the cancellation power was used for the purpose of
intimidating a witness.
14. Edwards v. Fidelity and Cas. Co., 123 So. 162, 163 (La. App. 1929). The
court's policy reasoning was as follows:
It is therefore not within his [the injured party's] power to give the notice
required by the policy, and, if notice is essential to his recovery, his right must,
as we have stated, depend upon the other party. We do not think that such was
the intention of the legislators....
We are told that it works a hardship on the insurer to be called on to
defend an action of this kind, as he has had no prior knowledge of the accident
and is not in a position to make a defense. As to the hardship and disadvantage
under which the insurer labors, and the difficulty under which the injured
party finds himsel f, we think that the ends of justice require that the benefit of
the doubt should be given to the injured party, who is in no way at fault, and
whose loss was caused entirely by some one else, as against the insurer who
has entered into the contract with full knowledge of the statute [changing the
indemnity policy to a liability policy] and for a monetary consideration.
15. 7 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 35:205 (2d ed. 1961). An
interesting and curious distinction is drawn if the agent merely knows of the mis-
representation of the insured and fails to correct it. Some cases hold that a recovery
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with, of course, the injured party) loses his claim against the insurer."
An argument can fairly be made that this rule of law is an unjustifi-
ably narrow application of ordinary agency principles. It has generally
been held that a principal is liable for the acts-even the fraudulent acts-
of his agent who is acting within the scope of his apparent authority."
This is true even in cases where an agent has himself directly benefitted
from the fraud on his principal and acted solely for his own interests and
not at all for those of his principal." The reasons underlying this rule
would seem to be that the principal has the power of choice over his agents
and has chosen the one involved; he has clothed the agent with apparent
authority (consisting in the area of insurance of signs, printed forms, rate
books, and so forth) ; and he is in a business which presumably is bring-
ing him profit.
Part of being in a profit-making enterprise is the responsible as-
sumption of the normal risks which that enterprise entails. This clearly
includes-and has included for centuries-the wrongful acts of agents,
even though this amounts in effect to strict liability for the principal.
The courts early made, and continue to make, these decisions on the theory
can nevertheless be had against the insurer where its agent knew the truth at the time,
provided there was no actual collusion, on the theory that the agent's knowledge is
imputed to his principal. Id. at § 35:202. And where the false statement is made
unintentionally by the applicant, it is the general rule that the insurance company is
bound, even if the agent knew of its falsity. Id. at § 35:201.
16. The theory of denial of recovery under such circumstances is that the insured
is the party who benefits from the protection granted by the insurance policy, and a
wrongdoer cannot profit from his own wrongdoing. This paper challenges that
normally valid position on the theory that other interests call for consideration in the
area of automobile insurance. It is true that a broader approach results in the dis-
advantage of protecting, up to the policy limits, the assets of the insured, who par-
ticipated in the fraud (although this could be mitigated in a tort action for deceit).
The response to this is that, as with so many legal questions, a weighing of interests
must take place, with this paper taking the position that the public interest in com-
pensation outweighs such disadvantage.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 165 (1958).
18. This is true if the third party does not have notice of the agent's wrongful
intent. Id. § 49, Comment g. It is true, of course, that in the circumstance involved in
this paper the traditional "third party" (the insured) knows full well of the wrongful
motive of the agent, and thus one can argue that the ordinary principles of agency law
are inapplicable. It is the thesis of this paper, however, that the "third party" should
include the public, who have come increasingly to expect that whoever wrongfully
injures them on the highway will have insurance. This reliance of the public has been
encouraged by the many actions of state legislatures with precisely this goal in mind.
Thus the general rule that a principal can be bound by even the wrongful acts of his
agents should carry over by way of analogy where the relying party is the public and
the insurance company is aware of that fact, which clearly seems the situation today.
An analogy to this problem of protecting the interests of third parties can be
drawn from corporation law, where a subscriber to shares who was induced to subscribe
by fraud can be denied his right to rescission if there were relying creditors subsequent
to the subscription. See Burningham v. Burke, 67 UTAH 90, 245 P. 977 (1926); R.
BAKER AND W. GARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 766 (1958).
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that this sort of foreseeable loss belongs to the business.1" It can and should
be represented in their costs and thus (at least theoretically, and in part
actually) reflected in the cost of their products to the consumer.20  The
medium of insurance has itself been an important factor in moist rationali-
zations of vicarious liability;2 1 there seems to be no reason why the in-
surance companies themselves should not be subject to the same theory.
2
The argument is admittedly ore difficult in the area of misrepre-
sentations by a broker " rather than an agent (although they are of course
both "agents" in the Restatement of Agency meaning of the ter-i 24 ). But
even here the insurance company has entrusted the front-line end of its
business to the broker. And the company has broad choice in picking the
19. See Jones v. Hart, 2 Salk. 441, 90 Eng. Rep. 1255 (K.B. 1698).
20. For a lengthy and thought-provoking articulation of the economics approach
to enterprise liability, see Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law
of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) [hereinafter referred to as Calabresi] See also
Glanville \Williams, Vicarious Liability and the Master's Indemnity, 20 MODERN L. REV.
220 (1957) ; Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J.
584 (1929). It should be noted that the economic rationalization for vicarious liability
is rejected in an intelligent article by C.R. Morris, Jr., Enterprise Liability and the
Actuarial Process-The Iisignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961).
21. The theory is that liability insurance allows the entrepreneur to avoid an
upsetting loss by paying a premium, which is a known amount and can easily be
calculated into his profit and loss picture. Some authors have thought that the factor
of insurance is by itself a sufficient explanation of vicarious liability, since it "spreads
the loss." See Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1923); SEAVEY,
STUDIES IN AGENCY 150-52 (1949).
22. This would seem particularly true in view of the fact that the insurance
business is a regulated industry, with rate approval by the states. Any easily definable
increased cost, like absolute liability for the acts of agents, would be an item that
insurance companies should have no trouble justifying to an insurance commissioner.
This would result in a true passing of the cost on to the customers, a fact which is
debatable (at least as to the extent of the passing on) in some industries.
23. An insurance broker is defined in 3 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
§ 25:92 (2d ed. 1960) as follows:
An "insurance broker" is one who acts as middleman between the insured
and the insurer, and who solicits insurance from the public under no employ-
ment from any special company, and who, upon securing an order, places it
with a company selected by the insured, or in the absence of such a selection,
with a company selected by himself; whereas an "insurance agent" is one
who represents an insurer under an employment by it.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1, Conmment e (1958). See also 3
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 25:93 (2d ed. 1960) :
In determining the problem here involved, it is necessary to remember that a
broker is not necessarily the agent of either the insured or the insurer
throughout. He may be the agent of one in some of the matters involved
and of the other in the remainder. . . .However, an insurance broker, although
first employed by one party, may during the process of negotiations become
the agent of the other: and in that event, he may acquire rights, have
powers and incur obligations with respect to both the insurer and the insured.
In fact it is said to be a general rule that an insurance broker acts for the
insured for the purpose of making the application and procuring the policy, and
for the insurer for the purpose of collecting and remitting the premium and
delivering the policy.
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brokers upon whom it will rely in contracting business for it. The dif-
ference, therefore, in the eyes of not only the insured but even more im-
portantly the public, is one of form only.
Although the present status of the law stands squarely contrary to
the position advocated here, a change in the approach of the courts, at
least in the area of automobile insurance, is called for. The insurance
company retains control; it is in a profit-making business; it can ade-
quately gauge and set up reserves for its losses; it can use its losses to
justify an increase in rates before the insurance commissions; imposing
liability upon insurance companies may induce a higher standard of care
in the selection, supervision and retention of agents and brokers ;"5 wrong-
ful acts by agents and brokers are a clearly foreseeable risk of the busi-
ness, and the public will enjoy increased security, slight though it may be.
All of these factors require a broader standard than now exists by which
to judge the responsibility of an insurance company for the acts of its
agents.
This argument is reinforced by the rapidly changing nature of insur-
ance in the area of automobile law. As noted above, in nearly all of the
compulsory insurance or financial responsibility legislation the defense
of fraud is expressly negated by statute. It is obviously, therefore, a
matter of some concern to the body politic. And no reports have come
filtering back about bankruptcy facing insurance companies as a result
of this legislative action."
Finally, and perhaps most significant, the entire system of privately
issued, liability-coverage-only automobile insurance has come under heavy
attack, which in turn has produced a revolutionary response from some
insurance companies. The primary catalyst toward change has been the
Keeton-O'Connell plan, proposed :several years ago after an extensive
foundation-financed study.27  The plan, which is basically a variant on
the theme of the Saskatchewan approach, combines both recovery without
fault and common law tort liability. The cut-off point (where the con-
mon law liability comes into play) is when more than $10,000 "hard
specials"2 or more than $5,000 pain and suffering have been lost. Up to
25. See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance
of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 595 (1961).
26. It is true that insurance companies have complained of losses in the com-
pulsory insurance states, but the complaints have not centered on the absence of the
fraud defense. Rather, they complain that claims consciousness rises and political
pressures keep rates artifically low. C. GREGORY AND H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 739 (1959).
27. KEETON AND O'CONNELL, supra note 10.
28. These are basically the readily determined economic losses arising out of an




that point"9 the recovery of a party injured in the use of an automobile is
non-fault and based on two-party insurance, i.e., the injured party re-
covers against his own insurance policy, similar to fire and life insurance.
The insurance would be compulsory for all drivers, which means that
nearly everyone injured in the use of an automobile would be covered.
For those few who lack coverage (non-driving pedestrians, for example,
who are hit bysomeone who has failed to obtain insurance) a special fund
would be established against which they could recover.
The abolition of the defense of fraud is apparently covered in Sec-
tion 2.11 of the plan, which leaves a great deal of discretion with respect
to policy forms and conditions of coverage in the hands of the Com-
missioner of Insurance. The Commissioner is solemnly cautioned to
"approve only such terms and conditions as are consistent with the pur-
poses of this Act and fair and equitable to all persons whose interests
may be affected.' '  In view of the position taken by nearly all of the
states which have enacted compensatory-type legislation, the drafters
doubtless were confident that the insurance would become absolute at the
time it was purchased.
The Keeton-O'Connell plan engendered an understandably defensive
response from the insurance industry as well as both plaintiffs and de-
fense lawyers."' Recently, however, an extraordinary response has come
forth from some of the insurance industry. The American Insurance As-
sociation, a trade group of casualty insurers handling about 38 per cent
of the nation's automobile insurance coverage, " has studied the Keeton-
O'Connell proposal and has come up with its own variant on that plan."3
The AIA supports the basic compensation theme of the Keeton-O'Connell
plan but would change it in two major respects: (1) the AIA plan would
completely eliminate fault-based recovery, going to a total non-fault, two-
party insurance system, with full recovery of economic losses; 4 and
(2) it would eliminate any recovery for pain and suffering, although
29. With the insignificant exception of the first $100 of damage, which would
remain under the common law liability system, Section 2.3(a), KEETON-O'CoNNELL,
supra note 10, at 309. See Id. at 275-276, where the theory behind this decision is
explained.
30. Section 2.11, KEETON-O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 318.
31. See TRIAL, (Oct./Nov. 1967), which is an entire issue devoted to a
pro and con discussion of the Keeton-O'Connell plan.
32. Boulder Daily Camera, Dec. 24, 1968, at 2, col. 3.
33. American Insurance Association, Report of Special Committee to Study and
Evaluate the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan and Automobile Accident
Reparations, Oct. 21, 1968 (available at the office of the American Insurance
Association, 85 John Street, New York, N.Y. 10038) [hereinafer referred to as AIA
Report]. This report was approved by the Executive Committee of the Association.
34. With the exception of lost wages exceeding $750 per month. See AIA Report,
supra note 33, at 5.
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persons suffering permanent impairment or disfigurement could receive
compensation up to 50 per cent of their hospital and medical expenses.
The underlying premise of these plans is that a certain activity
should bear all of the costs, including non-fault losses, that can be rea-
sonably related to engaging in it. A lengthy articulation of this premise is
contained in Calabresi's major article on the subject, " where the author
argues, in the spirit of allowing the consumer a full and intelligent choice
of purchases, that goods and services should bear what he describes as
their "full cost to society", " including non-fault losses that are caused by
the activity. It is true, of course, that Calabresi's definition of "cost" in-
volves a value judgment with which some economists and many account-
ants would not agree, but the logic of the position, assuming that losses
can intelligently be allocated to certain enterprises, seems inescapable.
This thesis has been elaborated on in other articles of his, " and its under-
lying premise was adopted in the AlA proposal."8  It is true that Cala-
bresi's approach has been intelligently attacked by Professors Blum and
Kalven, " but the mainspring of their attack was the assumption that any
automobile compensation plan had to result in an increase in the cost of
insurance, a point which has been rebutted by the actuarial estimates of
both the AlA proposal4" and by an independent actuarial study made of
the Keeton-O'Connell plan."1
In the face of these radical proposals, the change urged by this paper
seems small indeed. And if either of the above plans is accepted, the
problem of fraud doubtless will disappear. But they might not be ac-
cepted, certainly not in all the states, and the problem of fraud described
35. See Calabresi, supra note 20.
36. See Calabresi, supra note 20, at 505.
37. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation
of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1965) ; Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful
World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216 (1965) ; Calabresi, Views and Overviews,
1967 U. ILL. LAW FORUM 600: Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource
Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 67 (1968) ; Calabresi,
Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs 33 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 429 (1968).
38. ATA Report, supra note 33, at 5:
The committee is of the opinion that the automobile insurance system should
be the primary source of indemnity for injuries sustained in automobile accidents,
to the extent practicable. The motoring public should bear the cost of motor
vehicle accidents.
39. Blum and Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi, Auto Accidents and
General Deterrence. 34 U. CmII. L. REv. 239 (1967).
40. AIA Report, supra note 33, at 8. The ATA actuarial study estimates the cost
savings for their total non-fault proposal at approximately 29 per cent, and the cost
savings of the Keeton-O'Connell proposal at approximately 28 per cent. Apparently the
main savings would come from the elimination of contingent fees for lawyers. Id. at 4.
41. TRIAL, Oct./Nov. 1967, at 19.
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in this paper is with us today, as witness the fact situation described at
the beginning of this paper.
The enterprise liability approach outlined briefly herein has relevance
to this paper not only as a description of the direction the law seems to be
taking but also because its underlying value judgment fits perfectly into
the broader treatment of insurance company responsibility urged in this
paper. The trend toward universal coverage for motorists on the high-
ways is distinct and unmistakable. The common law removal of the de-
fense of fraud when an agent of an insurance company is involved fits
clearly into this pattern. The defense of fraud is an anachronism which
calls for updating.
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